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In regard to the third proposition, the landlord could not be con-
sidered a purchaser for value and without notice so that he could say
that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting his right to the possession
of the garage.4
E. J. B.
Injunction: Police officers not enjoined from searching premises
for intoxicating liquors; remedy at law adequate.-In Joyner v.
Hammond, 2oo N. W. 571 (Iowa), the court ruled that an injunction
would not issue to enjoin the chief of police and his officers from search-
ing the plaintiff's place of business for illegal liquor kept for sale. The
plaintiff's premises had previously been searched several times and the
plaintiff had grounds to believe they would be searched again and his
business and property injured. He alleged that the former search war-
rants were issued upon mere suspicion. The plaintiff had brought no
action for damages because of the previous searches and the opinion
fails to discuss the findings as to whether the warrants were issued
upon mere suspicion or upon probable cause. The court based its de-
cision on the ground: first, that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy
at law and second, that "an injunction will not lie to hamper and thwart
the power and discretion of the police touching the performance of
duties enjoined upon them by law." In other words, the court decided
that an injunction will never issue to enjoin the police from searching
one's premises under the statutory form of warrant, regardless of
whether the warrant was issued upon mere suspicion or probable cause
as the statute requires.
The court based its decision that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy
at law on a number of cases and citations. None of them are cases or
discuss cases precisely on all fours with this one but all discuss the
principles applicable when it is sought to enjoin police officers from
making arrests, and from interfering with private business in the exer-
cise of their duties. A discussion of these cases individually would
require too much space. The following are the most important rules
laid down in them. Police officers cannot be enjoined from performing
their duties of keeping the peace and seeing that the laws are obeyed.
Where the actions of the police are necessary in the suppression of an
unlawful business they cannot be enjoined because of incidental injury
to a private individual.' Equity will not enjoin police officials from
stationing officers near a place where liquor is sold, to warn intending
patrons that the place is disorderly and subject to raid, since, assuming
that the acts are illegal, if the assumption of fact is erroneous, that fact
must be established by law in an action for damages.2  Corpus Juris
states the rule as follows: "Police officers will not be enjoined from
performing their proper duties in the exercise of the general police
'Accord: Walker-v. Grand Rapids Flouring Mill Co., 70 Wis. 92, 35 N.W.
332; Wolf v. Klutch, 147 Wis. 209, 132 N.W. 98r.1 Mart v. Grinnell, 194 Iowa 499, 187 N.W. 471, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 678.
'Delaney v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323, 76 N.E. 2o9.
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power, even though the acts may be performed in an oppressive and
unlawful manner." But immediately following we find the statement
that "Where it is shown that illegal acts of police officers will result in
irreparable injury to the property rights of complainant, if an injunction
is not issued, injunctive relief will be available." 3 L. R. A. in a case note
questions the law as laid down in Delaney v. Flood and suggests that
"When one's business is injured by acts of the police officers the only
remedies are an action at law for damages, and a prosecution of the
police officers under a provision of the Penal Code which would at most
render them guilty of a misdemeanor and obviously these remedies
might be practically inadequate in a case where the continuation of the
unauthorized acts would result in the destruction of the business."'
The citations in the opinion to the effect that the motives of officers
in instituting criminal proceedings under criminal statutes cannot be in-
quired into in an action for an injunction are all cases where an attempt
was made to enjoin criminal prosecutions and the acts of the officers
were directed against the person of the plaintiff rather than against his
property.5
Should the recognized principle of law that the arrest of a person,
although unlawful, cannot be enjoined, be applied where an injunction is
asked to prevent police officers from interfering with and injuring pri-
vate property by unlawful and illegal acts?
There is no question but that an injunction cannot be obtained to
restrain police officers from searching a place of business under a search
warrant issued on the complaint and affidavit of some third person, re-
gardless as to whether or not that third person has probable cause for
obtaining the warrant,6 as long as the warrant is regular in all respects
on its face. In such cases the police officers are only performing their
duty; they are not doing any illegal act for they are protected by a war-
rant which is valid upon its face.7
But it appears that where the police officers themselves swear out the
search warrants, aft entirely different situation exists. Of course the
person injured by the unjustifiable swearing out of the warrant would
have his action for damages; but, as already stated, this is a very in-
adequate remedy. If an action were brought against an ordinary citizen
to restrain him from swearing out search warrants without reasonable
cause but merely for the purpose of annoying the individual whose prop-
erty is to be searched or preventing him from enjoying his property or
for the purpose of injuring him in his property rights there can be little
doubt but what the injunction would issue in Wisconsin.8
3 2C. J. 261.
'Pon v. Whitman, 147 Cal. 280, 81 Pac. 985.
'McDonald v. Deniton, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 42r, 132 S.W. 823. Id. 3o4 Tex.
2o6, 335 S.W. 1148, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 453.
'Wis. Stats. Sec. 4839.
7McLeait v. Cook, 23 Wis. 364; Marks v. Wright, 81 Wis. 572, 5 N.W. 882.
Holtz v. Rediske, ix6 Wis. 353, 92 N.W. no5.
" T. M. E. R. & L. Co. v. Bradley, 1o8 Wis. 467, 84 N.W. 870.
NOTES AND COMMENT
Such cases as Delaney v. Flood (supra), which have never been over-
ruled, though severely criticized in many jurisdictions, indicate that such
an injunction could not issue against a police officer. In other words the
illegal acts of a police officer which irreparably injure another's property
rights cannot be restrained because a police officer has the public duty
to keep the peace and see that the laws are obeyed. If such injunctions
were issued his efficiency as an arm of the law might be impaired.
Delaney v. Flood and the later cases stress the fact that the granting of
such an injunction would be taking from the criminal -courts, cases
properly within their jurisdiction and giving equity courts jurisdiction of
them. T. M. E. R. & L. Co. v. Bradley, supra, in which a criminal
prosecution for assault and battery was enjoined because commenced
merely for the purpose of annoying the plaintiff and injuring his prop-
erty rights, deprecates such reasoning in this state, and makes the first
reason the only logical one for such a decision.
As has been stated in case of illegal arrest it has long been recognized
that the police cannot be restrained; but in such a case, there is an actual
criminal proceeding instituted in which the guilt or innocence of the
party must be determined. The criminal courts cannot be deprived of
jurisdiction in such a case. But suppose an injunction is issued re-
straining the police from swearing out search warrants and proceeding
to execute them without reasonable cause. Does such an injunction
deprive the criminal court of jurisdiction? It is hard to see where it
does. No direct criminal actien has yet been started but merely an
auxiliarly legal proceeding used by the police to obtain evidence which
if it fails in its purpose will be dropped.
There is weight tcY the reason for refusing an injunction because of
the position which the police occupy. They are a very important factor
in carrying out the laws of the state and they occupy a position respected
by the people. It is to the interest of all that they should not be ham-
pered and deterred in performing their duties and it should not be with-
in the power of anyone to obtain an injunction against them which might
interfere with the performance of their duties.
On the other hand, the power of search and seizure is a dangerous one
as is shown by the fact that we have an express constitutional provision
that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized."9 If courts refuse
to issue such injunctions to prevent the police from obtaining search
warrants without reagonable cause and proceeding under them, the value
of this constitutional provision is certainly rendered negligible in many
cases. Where the police officers are unscrupulous, owners might be
forced to bribe them as the only practical method of protecting them-
selves from such illegal proceedings.
I Wis. Const., Article I, section ii.
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The writer can find but one Wisconsin case dealing with the question
whether an injunction will issue against police officers. In that case
the injunction was refused.1 The case is not in point on the proposi-
tion discussed because the injunction was asked to restrain the police
from arresting the plaintiff illegally and injuring his property. There is
no question but that an injunction will never issue to prevent the police
from making an arrest.
Four courts have held that an injunction lies to prevent police officers
from committing illegal acts.1 ' All of these were cases where the police
officers were enjoined from committing trespasses upon property with-
out lawful authority or any adequate reason or from searching or seiz-
ing property or arresting persons with absolutely no authority of law
and without a warrant. It is hard to distinguish some of the New York
cases from Delany v. Flood, but they all present a much stronger
ground for an injunction; in fact, in all the cases the equity was very
strong in favor of the plaintiff.
As a practical proposition it may be stated that the courts will gen-
erally look with disfavor upon any petition for an injunction against
police officers, and one should have a very strong equitable claim for
relief before attempting to secure such an injunction.
EVERETT P. DOYLE.
Vehicles: Street car is "vehicle" and street car's failure to yield
right of way held to justify a finding of its negligence.-It is undis-
puted that where both street railways and automobilists have the right
to use the public streets, the rights of each must be exercised with due
regard to the rights of the other and that such right must be exercised
in a reasonable and careful manner so as not to abridge or interfere
unreasonably with the right of the other.
That "the law of the road with reference to vehicles approaching at
street intersections" applies equally to street cars as well as to all other
vehicles was recently decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
the case of Bradley v. Minneapolis Street R. R. Co., 201 N. W. 6o6
(Minn.). The plaintiff in that case was seriously injured when the
automobile in which he was driving was struck by defendant's street
car at a street intersection. The court did not hesitate to pronounce the
defendant negligent by reason of the failure of its motorman to apply
'o Gaertner v. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 497.
American Steel Co. v. Davis, 261 Fed. 8oo; Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo. A. 406,
144 S.W. 9o4; Rosenberg v. Sheen, 77 N.J. Eq. 476, 77 A. ioig; Constantine v.
N.Y. City, ii6 Misc. 349, 19o N.Y. Supp. 372; Hale v. Burns, lol Appl. Div.
ioi, 91 N.Y. Supp. 929; Dinsmore v. N. Y. Bd. of Police, Abb. N. Cas. (N.Y.)
436; Adams Expr. Co. v. N. Y. Bd. of Police, 65 How Pr. (N.Y.) 72; Burns v.
McAdoo, 1H3 App. Div. 165, 99 N.Y. Supp. 5,; Hagan v. McAdoo, 113 App. Div.
5o6, 99 N.Y. Supp. 255; Levy v. Bingham, 113 App. Div. 424, 99 N.Y. Supp. 258:
McGorie v. McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 271, 99 N.Y. Supp. 47; Hale v. Burns, iot
App. Div. ioI, 91 N.Y. Supp. 929; Fairmount Athletic Club v. Bingham, 61 Misc.
419, 113 N.Y. Supp. 905; Cullen v. Bourke, 93 N.Y. Supp. o85.
